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ASTRACT. 
The overall aim of this research is to investigate a regulated state mecha-
nism established in economic relations between the Soviet state and indus-
try during the period of New Economic Policy (NEP) in Russia in 1921-
23. Within this paper, the characteristics of the processes of denationaliza-
tion, leasing of enterprises, organization of trusts and syndicates, search 
for the new forms of organization and management of industrial produc-
tion are presented. The research focuses attention on laws and regulations 
in industrial area. Historical evidence suggest that co-existence of various 
property forms and lease relations during the NEP period could not lead to 
the fully operational industrial enterprises, including large ones, since 
full-fledged market environment is necessary for market to function 
successfully.
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Resumen. El objetivo general de esta investigación es investigar un mecanis-
mo estatal regulado establecido en las relaciones económicas entre el estado 
soviético y la industria durante el período de Nueva Política Económica 
(NEP) en Rusia en 1921-23. Dentro de este documento, se presentan las 
características de los procesos de desnacionalización, arrendamiento de 
empresas, organización de fideicomisos y sindicatos, búsqueda de las nuevas 
formas de organización y gestión de la producción industrial. La investiga-
ción centra la atención en las leyes y normativas en el ámbito industrial. La 
evidencia histórica sugiere que la coexistencia de varias formas de propiedad 
y las relaciones de arrendamiento durante el período de la NEP no podría 
llevar a las empresas industriales totalmente operativas, incluidas las grandes, 
ya que el entorno de mercado completo es necesario para que el mercado 
funcione con éxito.
Palabras clave: nueva política económica, Siberia, industria, nacionalización, 
desnacionalización, arrendamiento, confianza, sindicato.
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1. Introduction
The story of ourselves becomes richer the more we know about, the more we 
study our own historical experience. Such issues as co-existence of planned 
and market mechanisms of governmental regulation that affected economic 
activity, introduction of self-financing, etc in NEP Russia have always been 
of great interest for researchers.
Lev Kafengauz, one of the economic theorists who lived during the NEP 
period and was actively involved in the process since its very beginning, in 
his monograph “Evolution of Industrial Production in Russia” (1994) focused 
on the problem of restoring the domestic market and monetary commodity 
exchange that recreated the equivalent links between industrial and agricultu-
ral producers. Having chosen the opposition between directive planning and 
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free market competition as the main thesis, V. Mau in his study (1993) focused 
on the methodology of the centralized planning mechanism in NEP Russia. 
Likewise, I. Orlov (2002) and I. Bystrova (1993) primarily investigated the 
negative effects of accelerated industrialization due to the introduction of the 
centralized planning mechanism in the USSR. The works of Western NEP 
researchers Peter J. Boettke (1990) and Sheldon L. Richman (2001) deal with 
the authoritarian policies of the Communist government and the ruling Russian 
Communist Party (Bolsheviks) which led to the end of the period of New 
Economic Policy in Russia.
Thus, many of the traditional explanations given by both Russian and Western 
historians for the problems of NEP Russia and organization and management of 
its industry during 1920s require re-examination. For this reason, it becomes 
relevant to start with defining conditions that could facilitate the fully operatio-
nal small and large industrial enterprises.
In the early 1920s Soviet Russia was on the verge of economic and social disin-
tegration and its industry was practically inoperative and in a state of disrepair. 
Since Russia was an agrarian country, the Bolsheviks understood that “World 
Revolution Dream” could not come true without developed industry to say 
nothing about the possibility for the Communist Government to retain its 
power.
In Siberia, the post-war devastation was aggravated by the terrible famine that 
swept the region in 1921-1924 (Baksheev, 2013). Against this background 
curtailment of commodity-money relations led to the serious disruption in the 
existing economic ties between the city and the countryside and, consequently, 
Siberian agriculture scaled down to subsistence farming. The volume of cottage 
industry reduced significantly as well as its marketability. According to V. 
Konovalov, in comparison with the year 1913, the total number of Siberian 
handicraftsmen and artisans fell by 1,7 times and accounted to 92,800 people. 
At the same time, the displacement of small-scale cottage producers by large 
industrial enterprises was slowed down: in 1920s, more than 90% of the indus-
trial enterprises in Siberia were artisanal and semi-artisan (1995, p. 75). The 
main aim of the Communist Government in industrial sphere was to expropriate 
and nationalize small industrial enterprises. But initially, in ideological com-
mitment to destroy capitalism, large and medium industrial enterprises had been 
nationalized.
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Introduction 
The relevance of the present study is determined by the current understanding 
of the complexity of such massive cultural phenomena as “rock music culture” 
and by the need to find theoretical and methodological pinpoints that are 
pertinent to those phenomena. There is a multitude of various definitions of 
rock music (as well as Russian rock music in particular) and each of them 
promotes one or more characteristics of the rock music culture as a special type 
of discourse [62]. Those definitions vary based upon which aspect is at the 
forefront according to the researchers. For instance, M. Solodova and E. Popova 
highlight the distinct subcultural impact of the Russian rock music: “The main 
extralinguistic characteristic of RMC [rock music culture - our interpretation] is, 
above all, its subcultural attribution, which determines all other traits of both 
RMC itself and its narrative. RMC <…> is a combination of beliefs and values 
which vigorously reject the predominating culture and offer an alternative way 
of navigating through modern reality.” [49, p. 79–80]. 
While Russian rock music and rock music culture is country-specific, it is a vital 
part of global rock music movement system, in terms of ethnolinguistic world 
view content. National researchers directly highlight the logocentric nature of 
Russian rock music, which according to them includes a special lyrical intensity 
of the narrative, as well as Russian rock lyricists being included in the overall 
Russian culture system: 
“For a variety of reasons (mainly because of the logocentric nature of Russia’s 
centuries-old culture, the rich literary, folklore and song traditions, the “hunger” 
for words which stems from the age of “stagnation”) the verbal aspect of 
Russian national rock music compositions becomes dominant”. [56, p. 3].
Being part of the phenomenon, A. Bashlachev identified the substance of 
Russian rock music: “Electric sparks in my chest. /  Drop your hats on the snow 
and let them ring louder. / Rock ’n’ roll, glorious paganism. / I love the season of 
the bells” [7]. K. Kinchev offers his version: “Tender hour, time of “Che” / Stars 
brocaded onto my shoulder / Flying in the rays, under the spell of doom / Labe-
led by the dark ROCK” [30]. In a Red Star newspaper interview, he revealed: 
“Rock music cannot exist outside of a crisis. Because it’s metaphysical, like the 
soul. In fact, rock music is a state of soul in itself. Show business may have ups 
and downs, crises…” [61].
Rock music represents a heterogenous, compositive phenomenon, which is 
anthropological and social in its nature, where none of its components may 
serve as a facilitating paradigm for the whole concept. On top of that, each of 
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The manifest public opposition to the policy of War Communism and the threat 
to the existence of the Communist Government forced the Bolshevik Party to 
retreat from all-out socialism and the plans for “World Revolution”. In March 
1921, the anti-Bolshevik armed rebellion in Kronstadt (the “Kronstadt revolt” in 
Soviet terminology) held under the slogan “All power to the Soviets and not to 
the parties” persuaded even the radical Left-wing to abandon the policy of War 
Communism.
In its place, Lenin introducedthe New Economic Policy, which started with the 
abolition of the detested food-requisitioning campaign and a return to a 
limited market economy. The NEP model of development was imposedchiefly 
to appease the still hostile peasantry, whilst the Bolshevik party employed the 
full weight of its propaganda machine to engender a new cooperative “link” 
relationship with peasantry in the attempt to “strengthen the alliance of 
working class and working peasantry”. In the summer of 1921, industrial crisis 
became evident and any further delays would pose a serious threat to the 
country.
The primary purpose of the current study is to investigate the Communist 
Government measures to regulate industry during 1921-23 and how those 
measures worked in practice, with particular reference to Siberia.
Research hypothesis: co-existence of various property forms and leasing 
relations during the NEP period could not lead to the fully operational indus-
trial enterprises, including large ones, since full-fledged market environment is 
necessary for market to function successfully.
In our opinion, the results of the research presented below confirm that the 
purpose of the current study has been achieved and the hypothesis has been 
confirmed.
2. Methods
The study became possible through a historical approach to the material, 
which encompasses data on the analysis of historical sources on the problem of 
government regulations of industry during the first years of the NEP as well as 
the legal acts of that period.
3. Results
In the summer of 1921, several decrees of the All-Russian Central Executive 
Committee and the Council of People’s Commissars of the RSFSR backed by the 
resolution of the Labour and Defense Council of the RSFSR paved the way for 
introducing of New Economic Policy (Decree of the Council of People’s Com-
missars of the RSFSR “On the Procedures for Leasing Enterprises Subordinated 
Government regulations of industry in NEP Russia during the period 1921-1923 and 
how it worked in practice with particular reference to Siberia
859
to the Supreme Council of the National Economy”, 1921; Decree of the 
Central Executive Committee, Council of People’s Commissars of the RSFSR 
“On Handicraft and Cottage Industry”, 1921; Decree of the Central Executive 
Committee, Council of People’s Commissars of the RSFSR “On Fishing 
Cooperation”, 1921; Resolution of the Labour and Defense Council of RSFSR 
“Basic Measures on Rehabilitation of Large Industry and Development of 
Production”, 1921). The period of NEP can roughly be divided into three 
stages: the first stage – since 1921 till 1923 –was the period of denationaliza-
tion, leasing of enterprises, organization of trusts and syndicates and deve-
lopment of market relations; the second stage –since 1923 till 1927 – 
restoration of industry and search for new forms of organization and mana-
gement in industry; and the third one –since 1927 till 1929 – the period of 
the end of NEP and the return to centralized planning mechanism.
Analyzing the transformations of industrial sector of Soviet economy,it is 
necessary to note here that, on the one hand, a limited return to free market 
economic took place. On the other, those transformations took place 
against the background of the nationalized industry and the state adheren-
ce to what Lenin called the “commanding heights” of the economy (Program 
of the Communist International, 1933). In terms of introduction of NEP in 
industry, it is worth mentioning that the Soviet state nationalized privately-
owned enterprises and established a system of economic relations built on 
the direct involvement of the Government in regulation of industry at every 
level: enterprise, industry, territory and, even, reproduction phases.
The study investigates the first stage of NEP, the main features of which in 
the industry in contrast to the period of War Communism were:
- denationalization of industrial enterprises,
- leasing of enterprises,
- organization of trusts and syndicates.
The findings show that in Siberia in the period prior to NEP there had been 
nationalized more than 1640 industrial enterprises, which employed from 
80 to 90 thousand workers according to various data. To function effectively 
the limited restoration of free market economic relations required regulari-
sed legal procedures. Thus, in Siberia, the Decree of the Siberian Revolutio-
nary Committee (Sibrevkom) “On Possibility to Transfer Industrial Enterpri-
ses to Cooperative Organizations, Private Persons and Foreign Concessions” 
of July 21, 1921 started the process of denationalization (Borodulina, 2018).
Under the Decree local Soviet officials,in the first place,freed themselves 
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from cottage-craft and artisan enterprises, which employed two or three 
workers and had capacity up to no more than five horsepower. Larger indus-
trial enterprises were still state-owned. By October 1, 1922, the campaign 
aimed to denationalize industry came virtually to a standstill. Out of 1640 
nationalized industrial enterprises, 739 (or 45%) were denationalized and, 
thus, more than 90% of enterprises returned to their previous owners 
(handicraftsmen and artisans) (Demchik, 1999).
In the late summer and early autumn of 1921 in different provinces of Sibe-
ria, a campaign to transfer enterprises to lease began. Initially, it was quite 
active as provincial Councils of National Economy (CNE) were in a hurry to 
get rid of small inoperative enterprises. The autumn of 1921 and the winter 
of 1922 was the period when local authorities and private persons entered 
into lease agreements most actively.
Lease agreements stipulated continued manufacturing of key production 
and smooth functioning of an enterprise. Rental fees (a share of the output 
(5-25%)) were paidto the state in kind or in cash. Primarily, local Soviet 
officials leased light and food industrial enterprises because those enterpri-
ses did not require neither significant working capital nor initial costs and 
produced goods that were in good demand. Almost half of the enterprises 
returned to the previous owners who well aware of the characteristics of the 
production process.They leased their previously owned enterprises, person-
nel, raw products, materials and fuel. As a rule, duration of lease agreements 
was up to 3 years given the national economic situation as well as the policy 
of the local authorities. Siberian CNEs did not seek to encourage leasing for 
longer periods and, by the winter of 1922, leasing policy was actually aban-
doned (Borodulina, 2014, p. 46-47).
The cost of production manufactured at enterprises leased was significantly 
higher than produced by state-owned enterprises. The high cost of produce 
could be attributed to the industrial structure which was, as rule, involved in 
production of food and consumer goods, the cost of which, in terms of 
man-day, was higher than in mining industry, metallurgy or heavy enginee-
ring. Besides, longer working hours, low-paid child labor and other viola-
tions of labor and tax laws placed enterprises leased in a good position to 
reap the benefits of additional profits. Entrepreneurs who leased industrial 
enterprises for the short-term were not interested in investing in reconstruc-
tion of enterprises, purchasing of new equipment, repair works or better 
working conditions, etc.
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lThe nationalized large-scale industry reflected all the attributes of War 
Communism. Private capital did not find a niche in large-scale industry. 
Technical equipment, staffing and predominantly used manual labor at 
large-scale privately owned enterprises deprived them of the possibility to 
compete against state-owned enterprises.
In NEP Russia, the main form of large manufacturing and mining industries 
were trusts. Trusts were organisedin accordance with the Labour and Defen-
se Council of RSFSR decree on “Basic Measures on Rehabilitation of Large 
Industry and Development of Production” in August 12, 1921. The enterpri-
ses, which were “the largest, more technically equipped, better organized 
and appropriately located”from a particular industry,were subject to the 
decree (Resolution of the Labour and Defense Council of RSFSR “Basic Mea-
sures on Rehabilitation of Large Industry and Development of Production”, 
1921).
Having organized trusts, the Communist government nevertheless remai-
ned the sole proprietor for both means of production and profits. Trusts 
could only dispose of working capital but even that limited independence 
was not always given to trusts. By uniting enterprises into trusts and subor-
dinating them to governmental economic bodies, the government created 
extremely favorable conditions for itself to stick to the centralized planning 
mechanisms. In accordance with the so-called production (production-
financial) programs, the government defined the planned performance for 
trusts. Though its indicators grew annually, the main characteristics were 
finished product, financing, wages, labor content, the size of profits and 
participation in trade operations. Having the rights for independence and 
self-financing, trusts since the very beginning were deprived of both inde-
pendence and self-financing. Such combination of planned and market 
economies had certain advantages, but far more – disadvantages.
Trusts were initially set up in the autumn of 1921 as legal entities, indepen-
dent in operational and economic activities and supposed to work on 
self-supporting basis. If the central government recognized the principle of 
non-interference in the economic activities of trusts, then, accordingly, it 
should have let them be independent to regulate their prices and sell their 
goods. But the government recognized also the need to stick to economic 
management with the elements of the distribution of goods in the interests 
of the itself. That was largely achieved through government mandatory 
contact. Through governmental regulatory bodies, trusts were to produce 
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goods at fixed, state-established prices, which almost never corresponded 
to current ones and were significantly lower than the cost of production. 
The government withdrew very often goodsfor free. Thus, trusts were hard-
wired to have losses, which the central government replaced from the 
budget or, more precisely, at the expense of agricultural producers. Thereby, 
there was formed the mechanism of authoritarian distribution which had 
nothing in common with the ideas of free market economy. Those govern-
mental regulations affected primarily heavy industry trusts, which were 
supposed to provide the industry with raw products, materials, fuel, and 
equipment.
There had been organized 38 trusts in Siberia by the 1st of October 1922. 
Siberian trusts united 184 industrial enterprises and employed 31,400 
workers (77.6% of employed by state-owned industry). Being the leading 
branches of Siberian industry coal and gold mining enterprises were united 
in trusts; central trusts were under the central direction of the Supreme 
Council of National Economy (SCNE), the central state body involved in 
administrating of the national economy in the USSR; in the same way, local 
trusts were under direction of regional economic councils. Syndicates, legal 
entities supervised by the Supreme Council of National Economy, were 
designed to sell produce manufactured by trusts and to distribute manda-
tory contracts among the enterprises of the trust. By the end of 1922 in the 
RSFSR, 16 syndicates were established and they served 176 trusts (68% of 
the total amount in Russia) (Sovnarkhozy, 2009).
Since trusts came into being as entities to carry out operational manage-
ment of industrial enterprises, the Siberian Industrial Bureau of the SCNE 
having been the body concerned with management of enterprises directly 
turned into the body that started to regulate and plan the activities of trusts. 
However, the Siberian Bureau supervised only a limited number of industrial 
enterprises. Reorganization of the administrative bodies was carried out at 
the level of local economic councils; their production departments were 
reorganized into trusts, technical departments of the economic councils 
regulated industrial performance.
During the period between 1921 and 1922 state trusts could have been 
reorganized into joint-stock companies, which at that time were wides-
pread in the forms of syndicates or unit investment companies 
(associations), etc. The Decree of the Central Executive Committee and the 
Council of People’s Commissars “On State Industrial Enterprises that Operate 
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on Commercial Basis” (1923), on the first count offered a comprehensive 
legal basis for a state-owned enterprise to function as an integral whole in 
NEP Russia. But equally important is the second characteristic of the decree 
mentioned above, it excluded the possibility for large-scale industry of any 
other form of property except for state-owned to arise. That idea was clearly 
expressed by M. Tomsky, the chairman of the All-Union Central Council of 
Trade Unions, later in 1928, “We do not and cannot have public-corporate 
industry – all our industry is state-owned industry, its every form and type 
are subject to governmental regulations” (How NEP Was Abandoned, 2000, 
p. 255).
Thus, 1923 was the year when industrial trusts were divided into three large 
groups. The first group included trusts, which produced mainly for the 
market; they defined sales markets, set prices for raw products, materials 
and could even influence the price of goods by themselves. They were 
mainly presented by light and food industry trusts and were subject to repu-
blican, regional and provincial regulations, although they also worked 
based on government mandatory contract. Though trusts were self-help 
organisations, in fact, theywerelame ducks, they have little real poweras 
they could not distribute their profits since the profits belonged not to the 
trust but to the state as the owner of the trust. In Siberia, the trusts were 
represented by Siberian Butter Trust (Sibmaslotrest), East Siberian Regional 
Trust of Fermenting and Non-alcoholic Industry (Brodtest), East Siberian 
Regional Trust for Processing of Agricultural Produce (Vostsibselprom), East 
Siberian Territory Leather Industry Trust (VostSibkozhtrest), etc.
The second group included heavy industry trusts and in Siberia the second 
group was represented, for example, by Regional East Siberian Industrial 
Construction Trust (Vostsibpromstroy). As a rule, those trusts were obliged 
to work on the basis of mandatory contract at arbitrary prices. Most of them 
were unprofitable but the state did not want to let them go into commercia-
lly driven environment for reasons primarily ideological.
The third group of trusts included mining trusts, for example, State East 
Siberian Trust for Gold Mining (Vostsibzoloto) or Siberian Forest Trust of 
Forest industry, etc. Having been established back in 1906-1914 based 
mainly of foreign capital, those trusts were making the major contribution 
to foreign currency earnings of the Soviet state (Baksheev, 2016, p. 11).
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After the “price crisis” of 1923, the Communist government was particularly 
active to intervene in pricing system, with the aim of closing the “scissors 
gap” between prices for agricultural and industrial produce. The vast majori-
ty of the party officials were sure that the mismatch between prices for 
agricultural and industrial products had caused the crisis. Indeed, such 
divergence of prices really existed but it was not the cause but the conse-
quence. After all, agriculture consumed only one-fourth of industrial output. 
The main consumers of industrial production were the city and industry. The 
reason is that, having received in the summer of 1923 a special regulation of 
the Supreme Economic Council that ordered trusts to make maximum profit 
their top priority, the trusts began to sharply raise prices. In search of a quick 
breakthrough in the crisis, the government forced the trusts to cut down 
soaring prices. Although the emergency measures helped, market ideology 
– salability – was distorted. Better prices resulted in the fact that consumers 
absorbed through increased consumption a large part of what might have 
been marketed.
Thus, the market was deprived of its main function – to regulate supply and 
demand. Since then a shortage of goods stayed with the USSR forever.
Regulation of social produce in conditions of material and financial imba-
lance put the industrial enterprises, which were united in trusts deprived of 
economic independence, in extremely difficult conditions. Since the onset 
of NEP such a system of management offered certain incentives, but later it 
hindered the development of the Soviet industry.
The main regulatory mechanism for trusts at that time was the production 
and credit plan, aimed not to restore the market conditions but to find a way 
out of short-term economic problems. However, solo state regulation could 
not be a decisive factor in successful implementation of the advantaged 
offered by free market conditions. Nevertheless, leading party industrial 
officials saw the way out of the crisis in managerial changes in industry but 
not in changing the approach to the problem of state regulation.
It should be noted that some trusts began to give the enterprises more 
independence, allowing them to store up raw materials and sell their produ-
ce. First of all, these were trusts involved in production of goods of mass 
consumption. However, trusts operating through government subsidies 
were reluctant to let enterprises to become self-financing organisations 
even after the decree issued by the All-Russian Central Executive Committee 
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and the Council of People’s Commissars on “Regulations on State Industrial 
Trusts” (1927), according to which enterprises should have become 
self-financing entities.
The system of organization and management had significant shortcomings 
indeed but the reason for the collapse of NEP was in the approaches to 
management and were evident since its onset. In early 1923, development 
of the concept of self-financing was transformed into the problem plan-
market relationship. No matter how we interpret the plan today, one thing is 
certain – the entire Communist government strategy for building the socia-
list sector stemmed from the idea that the plan was the genuinely socialist 
way of development that opposed free market and limited its influence. The 
possibility to regulate industry through free market mechanisms was not 
even considered.
4. Conclusion
Summarizing the results of the study, we conclude that that introduction of 
the New Economic Policy benefitted both denationalization and lease of 
Siberian small industry, but the reforms were insufficient and the years 
1921, 1922 and 1923 inherited features of War Communism. As the result 
handicraft and cottage industry could not overcome crisis, development of 
privately owned industrial enterprises was hampered by restrictions on the 
size of fixed productive assets and lack of financing, but even more, by the 
policy of the Soviet government aimed to preserve the “commanding 
heights” of economy.
In this regard, it is worth noting here that mixed market economy of extensi-
ve state ownership coexistent small-scale capitalist enterprise, a market 
relationship with individual producers and leasing relations is not sufficient 
for market to function properly. Market require proper economic environ-
ment for economic entities to exist. NEP Russia lacked capacity to suffi-
ciently regulate industry and failed to create appropriate conditions for 
large-scale industry.
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